Desiree A. Desierto

Desiree A. Desierto is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the Hamilton School. Desierto is an economist and political scientist whose research spans political economy, economic history, and economic theory. Using formal game-theoretic models alongside historical data and econometric analysis, she studies institutional change, corruption and rent-seeking, legal institutions, religion, and political development. Her work has been published by Economic Theory, the Journal of Development Economics, the Journal of Economic History, the Journal of Comparative Economics, and the European Economic Review. She is co-editor of the Economics, Religion, and Governance book series and the Journal of Economics, Management, and Religion published by World Scientific.

Current Project

Desierto’s current book project, Noble Bargain: The Political Economy of Feudal Rule (co-authored with Mark Koyama, under contract with Cambridge University Press), examines the historical and institutional foundations of liberalism and pluralism in premodern England. Desierto and Koyama apply a theoretical framework they pioneered based on coalitional bargaining to study how the forging and dissolution of ruling alliances among feudal elites shaped state consolidation in medieval Europe. Parallel papers analyze the Magna Carta, the English Reformation, the origins of political parties, and early modern state-building, illuminating how economic incentives, coalition dynamics, and institutional design have shaped the long arc of political development in the West.

Education

• Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2019
• Ph.D., Economics, University of Nottingham, 2006
• M.Sc., Development Economics, University of Oxford, 2002
• M.Ec., Economics, Macquarie University, 2001
• B.S., Business Economics, University of the Philippines, 1997

Publications - Articles

“Castles” (with Mark Koyama). 2026. European Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105281
“The Political Power of Civil Society” (with Mark Koyama). 2026. Journal of Comparative Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2026.01.007
“A Model of Theft and Bribery.” 2025. Economica. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.70003
“Feudal Political Economy” (with Mark Koyama). 2024. Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01583-8
“Shipwrecked by Rents” (with Fernando Arteaga and Mark Koyama). 2024. Journal of Development Economics.
“The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe” (with Mark Koyama). 2024. The Journal of Economic History.
“Religious Violence and Coalition Politics in History” (with Mark Koyama). 2024. Journal of Historical Political Economy.